<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: The rise of futures trading, part who knows what</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html</link>
	<description>Economic Sociology from the Ground Up</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2011 15:24:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html#comment-299</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 13:22:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/?p=680#comment-299</guid>
		<description>Mike - what was interesting in open outcry trading was that knowing the commodity didn&#039;t really make much difference. Traders sometimes traded commodities in which they had no expertise. But what &lt;em&gt;was&lt;/em&gt; important was knowing the social norms of the pit in which you wanted to trade.

So you could trade interest rates, grains, securities futures all without much knowledge of the underlying. But not realizing that when you walked into the Nasdaq or SP500 pit people sometimes assigned trades to you without your knowledge, you could get screwed. Or not knowing who the players in the pit are, you could make money taking a position but not day trading.

This is maybe another version of local versus abstract risk. No local knowledge needed. All form, no content.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mike &#8211; what was interesting in open outcry trading was that knowing the commodity didn&#8217;t really make much difference. Traders sometimes traded commodities in which they had no expertise. But what <em>was</em> important was knowing the social norms of the pit in which you wanted to trade.</p>
<p>So you could trade interest rates, grains, securities futures all without much knowledge of the underlying. But not realizing that when you walked into the Nasdaq or SP500 pit people sometimes assigned trades to you without your knowledge, you could get screwed. Or not knowing who the players in the pit are, you could make money taking a position but not day trading.</p>
<p>This is maybe another version of local versus abstract risk. No local knowledge needed. All form, no content.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Mike</title>
		<link>http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html#comment-298</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2009 00:17:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/?p=680#comment-298</guid>
		<description>&quot;As in, ‘hey, we could do the same shit with grain as with DMarks’ - so the diffusion boomerangs back on the agriculturals with a new model derived from the financials.&quot;

Definitely.  When I learned futures trading formulas/modeling, the underlying doesn&#039;t really matter much.  It&#039;s all expectations, volatility, and carrying cost, not fundamental differences in the actual underlining (even the way the term &#039;underlying&#039; gets deployed betrays this).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;As in, ‘hey, we could do the same shit with grain as with DMarks’ &#8211; so the diffusion boomerangs back on the agriculturals with a new model derived from the financials.&#8221;</p>
<p>Definitely.  When I learned futures trading formulas/modeling, the underlying doesn&#8217;t really matter much.  It&#8217;s all expectations, volatility, and carrying cost, not fundamental differences in the actual underlining (even the way the term &#8216;underlying&#8217; gets deployed betrays this).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Peter</title>
		<link>http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html#comment-297</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 18:32:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/?p=680#comment-297</guid>
		<description>&lt;em&gt;might resemble a diffusion model&lt;/em&gt;

I agree maybe, but what do you think the &#039;core&#039; is here, and why 90 years with little change then 30 years of massive speculation?

One hypothesis is that it&#039;s about marketing by the exchanges, to go after wealthy clients as potential speculators.

A second hypothesis is that financials began in 1974 with currencies, 1975 for GNMA futures, then 1981 for interest rates. It could be that the agricultural futures got a second look from finance people once they were mobilized around financials. As in, &#039;hey, we could do the same shit with grain as with DMarks&#039; - so the diffusion boomerangs back on the agriculturals with a new model derived from the financials.

And maybe it&#039;s &lt;em&gt;just like&lt;/em&gt; the hybrid corn processes, in that the massive negative externalities happen later, and are not obvious from the beginning. That certainly is one fear about hybrid corn et al. (even with the familiar dismissal as doomsayers, that).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>might resemble a diffusion model</em></p>
<p>I agree maybe, but what do you think the &#8216;core&#8217; is here, and why 90 years with little change then 30 years of massive speculation?</p>
<p>One hypothesis is that it&#8217;s about marketing by the exchanges, to go after wealthy clients as potential speculators.</p>
<p>A second hypothesis is that financials began in 1974 with currencies, 1975 for GNMA futures, then 1981 for interest rates. It could be that the agricultural futures got a second look from finance people once they were mobilized around financials. As in, &#8216;hey, we could do the same shit with grain as with DMarks&#8217; &#8211; so the diffusion boomerangs back on the agriculturals with a new model derived from the financials.</p>
<p>And maybe it&#8217;s <em>just like</em> the hybrid corn processes, in that the massive negative externalities happen later, and are not obvious from the beginning. That certainly is one fear about hybrid corn et al. (even with the familiar dismissal as doomsayers, that).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: brayden</title>
		<link>http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/2009/05/29/the-rise-of-futures-trading-part-who-knows-what.html#comment-296</link>
		<dc:creator>brayden</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 17:55:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.rethinkingmarkets.org/?p=680#comment-296</guid>
		<description>In some ways the sudden rise in futures trading might resemble a diffusion model (from the periphery to the core). What&#039;s interesting about the diffusion of futures is that it didn&#039;t have the same positive, or at least benign, consequences that other kinds of diffusion (e.g., hybrid corn) processes have. Diffusion created some profound negative externalities.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In some ways the sudden rise in futures trading might resemble a diffusion model (from the periphery to the core). What&#8217;s interesting about the diffusion of futures is that it didn&#8217;t have the same positive, or at least benign, consequences that other kinds of diffusion (e.g., hybrid corn) processes have. Diffusion created some profound negative externalities.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

