
I am assistant professor of Sociology at Barnard College. My book (and my dissertation research) is a comparative study of technology and futures trading, an ethnography of open outcry and electronic traders. My current research is on how art specialists price cultural commodities, particularly how categories and commensuration work in the secondary/resale fine arts market. I teach courses in economic sociology, organizations, and gender.
I occasionally consult, focusing on organizational change, the future of technology and financial markets, and environmental markets. I do strategic assessments of markets, technology and organizational design, with qualitative and quantitative components. If you are interested, please email me.
I grew up outside Chicago, and went to school(s) at Wesleyan University, USC, and Northwestern University. I currently live in New York, with a partner who is a marketing manager for an educational nonprofit. I love movies, like to cook, and I can do a mean lindy swing out. I am INTP.
Filed under: Markets — Peter @ 11:00 am
There was a time when capital, financial, housing markets were distinct-but-related. Housing prices changed with changes in interest rates; the dot-com boom and bust created and lost jobs; the stock and bond markets moved in conjunction with these changes. But while related, they were pretty much distinct kinds of markets. This was true for a few reasons.
First, different people traded different markets. Equity desks (stocks) and futures traders (fixed income) were different people, with different skill sets necessary to actually trade these markets. Mergers and acquisitions departments were deal-makers; private wealth desks were relationship managers; futures traders were cowboys; municipal bond traders were plodders.
Second, different technologies of trading made these markets comparable via performance (that is, returns on investment) but not otherwise comparable. In other words, we could look at stocks, bonds, and real estate, and we could measure their Returns on Investment (ROI) over time. But the question of how much a real estate investment was worth relative to an investment in corporate bonds, relative to fixed income derivatives, all while capital is being applied to them? This question is a notoriously difficult one to answer.
And so, the world looked something like this:
This changes with two things: risk models, and technology
Risk becomes something that can itself be traded. When portfolio managers argue that a portfolio ‘needs more vol’, for example, it means that it needs more ‘risk’. Risk is being commoditized.
So now the world looks less like a set of distinct silos and more like this:
As a result of this fact - this fact of the contemporary world of risk management and globalized finance - a number of assumptions that we had previously held to be true no longer are. For example, arguably commercial banks, insurance companies, and investment banks are indeed all doing the same thing: they are all trading in risk. The ways they do this continue to differ, but the underlying ways that they can calculate their worlds have moved closer. This means, per someone like Robert C. Merton (and people who believe in him in the Treasury Department and in Congress), that we should allow the institutional barriers between these kinds of firms fall to follow their functions. Or, it means that the old regulations that separated these entities institutionally need to be revised to provide protections in a world where they are all doing the same thing. This is obviously now an open question.
A second assumption, that financial ’safety’ comes in offsetting risks across a number of uncorrelated markets - diversification - no longer means what it used to mean. If the silos no longer hold, the problem is that ‘uncorrelated’ risks become correlated in the very act of tying them back into a risk portfolio. What we see instead is not ‘uncorrelated’ risk - barriers across different kinds of markets - but rather conduit of risk across these markets. Diversification becomes contagion. Why does the stock market drop 700 points when people are worried about credit markets? In no small part because hedge funds are bracing for mass extractions of capital. And so they are dumping their most liquid investments to have cash on hand. Credit and equities are supposed to be distinct - and now they are moving together. Risk becomes the conduit through which markets become linked.
We’re bracing for a new world, and it is unclear to me that the institutional changes that have been brewing over the past three decades are well-understood. New approaches would be mighty useful right now, and more so going forward.
October 6th, 2008 at 9:34 am
meta? ??…
“Risk becomes the conduit through which markets become linked.” - Peter Levin…