September 2008
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
« Aug   Oct »
1234567
891011121314
15161718192021
22232425262728
2930  

Month September 2008

Market meltdown, and there is blame to go around

*update: I did not mean to include JPMorgan in my list of independent broker-dealers. They are already JPMorgan Chase.

With the imminent demise of Lehman and the purchase of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America this weekend, you might be asking yourself, “What in the world?” Well, let’s say a few things first about the current crisis, and then about some of those responsible.

Here is what I think is going on:
- This is not a market collapse, in the sense of a price drop in the stock market. It is an institutional collapse because of a price drop. In other words, as long as housing prices, avarice, and economic growth propped up the more esoteric derivatives based on mortgage payments, the value of those derivatives would stay high. When that collapsed last year, many of the investment banks were left holding on to hundreds of billions of dollars of financial crap. Lehman lost over half its assets’ value in the past year (from $32 billion to $14 billion). Merrill lost about the same percentage, though a much larger number (from $64 billion to $28 billion).

- This is an institutional collapse, in that we should expect to see a number of institutions falter and then either get bailed out by the federal government, “bailed in” by a consortium of other firms (who would guarantee credit, take on some assets, or both), or bought out. Some of these firms seem like they cannot fail. But they will. We’re talking about Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley. Effectively, all the independent broker-dealers are potentially on the block. More traditional banks with commercial deposits, less leverage, and less exposure to the financial markets as such are in better shape.

- Investor money in brokerage firms is probably, but not necessarily, safe. These assets are not guaranteed under FDIC, but there are other protections, and it has never happened that customer brokerage accounts have been lost because a bank went under. Though, that does not mean that it couldn’t happen. Just that it hasn’t. The value of your investments may go down dramatically with the stock market, but they will probably be around. Merrill’s customers will likely just become B of A customers, or whatever they call the new entity.

- The finance sector economy, especially for New York City, is likely about to be in for a battering.

- It is unclear how the financial crisis will be related to the ‘real’ economy. It will be harder to get a loan, both residential and commercial. Assets like treasury bills will skyrocket (because of a ‘flight to quality’, though who know how much quality our gov’t bills have currently), which means that rates will fall. But no one will want to give credit. So now is the time to protect your credit rating. Right Martha? This all may exacerbate an already shaky consumer-spending-driven economy.

There is more, but we should also allocate blame.

- Most directly to blame are the Wall Street firms themselves. Greedy, greedy, unable to look long-term, willing to put their bottom lines ahead of main street’s interests. The people who tout how much value they bring to the world to justify the salaries they earn won’t get hurt the worst, but probably deserve to.

- Homeowners and the ‘main street’ crowd who bought bigger houses than they could afford, because everyone else was doing it, and who squinted, fudged, or outright lied on their loan applications because no one asked. Entitlement is wonderful, it can happen to you. And you should be held responsible for your actions, net of the pushy, fraudulent loan brokers and investment bankers who convinced you that you could get a point or two more on Puerto Rican municipal bonds.

- Regulators in congress and the fed, including Chuck-frickin’-Schumer, who has been the most hypocritical Democrat in the senate. With his faux-caring about middle-class families (the Baileys!) while taking care to keep regulation off the backs of Wall Street, screw you man. But of course it’s more than this. Phil Gramm (bigger jerk than Schumer) helped pass the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 to ‘reform’ banking regulation. Meaning, to give investment banks free reign to do whatever they want. I’m always amazed at people in government who hate government. Gramm’s wife presided over the CFTF (which regulates futures markets), and Republicans in general have nodded sagely at the travails faced by Wall Street in the face of draconian governmental regulation. And responded by loosening as many restrictions as possible.

- Robert C. Merton. Seriously. The academic backbone of the ‘functional’ persepective in financial regulation, meaning that a) markets are efficient; b) market functions are more important than market institutions; and c) market institutions will, magically-competitively, gravitate towards efficiency. His premises? There are two:

1) financial functions are more stable than financial institutions – that is, functions change less over time and vary less across geopolitical boundaries; and
2) competition will cause the changes in institutional structure to evolve toward greater efficiency in the performance of the financial system.”
- A Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation. 1995, pp. 23.

He contends all sorts of things that help us to understand our current situation:
- the shift over the past three decades from normal banking to complex derivatives have contributed to ‘vastly reduced costs of financial transactions’; a shift away from ‘opaque’ institutions towards transparent institutions; that options markets on fixed-income instruments would lead to better and more transparent credit evaluations than more conventional credit ratings. True; false; false.

As he notes, “financial innovation is the engine driving the financial system towards its goal of greater economic efficiency. Innovation in financial intermediation improves efficiency by completing markets, lowering transaction costs, and reducing agency costs” (36). Or, exactly the opposite of what is happening. Thanks Robert!

Takashi Murakami and Burned Art

Jennifer Lena and I have a new video up, a continuation of our conversation about the relationship between cultural value and monetary value. We’re talking about devaluation, specifically burned art – in the high art and pop art worlds. And we’re circling around a discussion of spheres/circuits/arenas of value.


Burned Art and Murakami from Peter Levin and Jennifer Lena on Vimeo.

Our tech is still low, but hopefully getting better (it looks better when it’s on Vimeo and not embedded). And we are again deeply hoping for some comments, reactions, and thoughts. And our first video is still around as well, if you are interested in seeing where it began.

Why didn't this work?

Remember the KLF? Sure you do. British? 80s-90s? Hrm.

Well, they created a foundation for promotion of avant garde arts, and as part of this they burned a million quid of their own money. Here is the documentary, in 6 parts. The burning is in part 2:
part 1
part 2
part 3
part 4
part 5
part 6

By most measures at the time and since, this act was an artistic and social failure. Wikipedia has more. The question is, what made this sad and gross, and not art?

Human eror or cmoputer error?

Another story today about the relationship between technology and human discretion. Apparently, Google picked up an old story that was undated on the internet (really from 2002), and re-posted it as a story from today: that United Airlines was headed for immanent bankruptcy. Wanna see what happens when people suddenly think that you are a company going bankrupt?

UAL's bumpy ride. Is this human error or market error?

UAL's bumpy ride. Is this human error or market error?

NASDAQ’s response was to tell investors, tough cookies:

Once trading resumed 90 minutes later, UAL shares rebounded, but they still closed off 11% for the day at $10.92. Nasdaq, a unit of Nasdaq OMX Group Inc., said that it had reviewed transactions involving UAL shares during a 13-minute period before the halt and that all trades will stand. A trade for 100 shares at a penny apiece occurred on another exchange after the trading halt on Nasdaq and was later cancelled.

The reason for NASDAQ’s response is worth noting, even if it is not noted. Exchanges have a deep stake in defending the view that there are market errors, and then there are human errors. And a market error – an error that implicates the platform and mode of trading itself in the systemic mucking up of financial transactions – is deeply problematic for exchanges. Attributing the error to human errors – that buyers/sellers correctly placed orders which were correctly matched – allows exchanges to maintain their self-image as market infrastructure.

I’m sure Google and Income Securities Advisors Inc. will have more to say about the incident.

Effects of Markets 2.0

[Warning: this post is a bit long. If you're not interested, you can try instead the music stylings of Gary Numan.]

In markets 2.0, I refer to the data that is generated as part of normal market transactions. The 2.0 references web 2.0, where the ‘social data’ generated by web interactions and transactions has acquired a kind of life of its own. I make no super-special claims that markets now are wholly different from markets in the past. But some of their properties have become increasingly visible and important.

Let’s take the basic case. In a financial market, if Gordon Gecko and I make a trade, a couple things happen. First, money goes in one direction, and a commodity or security goes in the other direction.

Basic model of a market transaction

Basic model of a market transaction

I’m playing a bit fast and loose here, but you get the idea. Let’s call this markets 1.0. Exchanges like the occur all the time in lots of different places. And if you wanted to generate outwards, I interact with all kinds of people in ‘markets 1.0′ mode – iTunes when I listen to a song, colleagues when I ask about a job, my bank when I enter into a transaction. I have in mind a particular case (capital markets) of what I think is a more general phenomenon.

Small world

A student today asked me if I knew Brayden King. Another asked me if I knew Shamus Khan. For the most part, I would say, if the person is in economic sociology or organizations, possibly culture or gender as well, I probably have met them at some conference, know them personally, or at least know their work. Not always, but often. If they are at Barnard or Columbia and in the sociology departments, I almost surely know them.

It’s funny how wide a world one imagines academia to be, and how small it actually is.

Oh, and by the way, it was ‘Brayden King, one of the founders of orgtheory.net’. Geez, I knew him when he was just braydenking.com – well, sans the embedded, hijacked porn links…

$10 bill

When the bidding for the $10 reached $20, I got a little edgy. When it reached $40, I stopped the auction.

Today is the first day of class, and in recent iterations, I have done an exercise where I auction off a real $10 bill. The auction has a lore at Kellogg, and it has been written up in a management education journal. The rules are as follows:

1. Bidding starts at $.50 and proceeds in $.50 increments. And yes, this is for real money.
2. No jump bidding.
3. The auctioneer will give all bidders a fair warning before the auction ends.
4. Cartels and collusion among bidders are strictly prohibited. This means no communication, verbal or nonverbal, is allowed.
5. The highest bidder pays what they bid and receives $10.
6. The second highest bidder pays what they bid.

Yes, I tell them, this is for real money. Instead of a $20 at $1 increments (as in the article), I use a $10 at $.50 increments.

A bit about the composition of my class. There are 25 or so students, in a 9AM class on the first day of the semester. Between 1/3 and 1/2 are Columbia students, and about 1/5 of them are men. These numbers are pretty average for a lecture class at Barnard. These are undergraduates, and although some know each other, they are generally strangers. Before the auction began, I introduced myself, and I had them turn and introduce themselves to their neighbors.

The first auction proceeded, with quite a few bids. As the bids got closer to $10, fewer students bid, and one student who had not bid at all up through $8, $8.50, $9, $9.50 jumped in to bid ‘$10!’. When the next highest bidder bid $10.50, his face kind of fell. The first auction ended up going for $11.50, with the winner paying $11.50 for the $10 bill, and the second highest bidder paying $11.

Then I brought out a second $10. Again, a lively set of bidder engaged with the bidding up to around $8, when a couple of newer bidders joined. This time, they pushed through $10 pretty quickly. A woman in the front row was bidding the ‘evens’ ($10, $11, $12), while a man in the back row was bidding the .50s ($10.50, etc.). When the bidding hit $15, a student next to the back-row man dropped his jaw and started staring at him. At $20, the woman in the front muttered ‘why won’t he stop?’. The class reaction went from laughing (at $10-15), to incredulous (at $20), to a version of what I can only describe as sullen (at $35).

When the auction showed no sign of stopping at $40, like the author of the paper, I stopped the auction, and allowed the students to do a closed-bid, uniform-price auction, or Vickrey auction. The final bids for the $10 were $49, and $51.00. The winner paid $49 for the $10, and the second-highest bidder paid $48.50.

Yes, I took (or am taking, as one of the students asked to pay in installments) the money. I am using it for a charity/class project/treats to be named later. In the article, where the author conducted the experiment at Kellogg management school, with $20 and a group of students both more aggressive and more cash-rich than my undergrads, one auction went up to almost $2000. Yep. $2000.

Why does this work, and what is the value of it for my Sociology of US Economic Life class? It works because the rules of this auction set up conflicting sets of incentives – it facilitates a shift from ‘getting a bargain’ to ‘avoiding a loss’ quickly and easily. The reactions from the students were really interesting as well. One said that at some point, if you’re going to lose a ton of dough, you may as well at least win the $10. Another complained that when the price began to get high enough, the difference between first and second start to get smaller, and it becomes ‘irrational’ for players to keep bidding. I pointed out that it was irrational at $11.

In fact, my point in using the exercise (the management school uses it to demonstrate the challenges of commitment, loss aversion, setting limits and expectations before acting, etc.) is to demonstrate that while markets may work as they are ‘supposed to’, the underlying rules matter a huge amount. The devil really is in the details. And just calling something a ‘market’ does not make it efficient, even if it looks generally market-like. This is not inconsistent with some variants of institutional economics of course, and I’m happy to say so – despite some caricatures, not all economic sociologists reflexively bash economists. What I would say, however, is that markets are fundamentally social constructions, and when something is a social construction, you better be clear on the hows before you go ahead and assume it works.

All in all, a pretty intense and hopefully interesting first day of class.